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Abstract 
We estimate the effect of the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) – a transfer tax on the 
purchase price of property or land – on different types of household mobility using micro 
data. Exploiting a discontinuity in the tax schedule, we isolate the impact of the tax from 
other determinants of mobility. We compare homeowners with self-assessed house values on 
either sides of a cut-off value where the tax rate jumps from 1 to 3 percent. We find that a 
higher SDLT has a strong negative impact on housing-related and short distance moves but 
does not adversely affect job-induced or long distance mobility. Overall, our results suggest 
that transfer taxes may mainly distort housing rather than labor markets. 
Keywords: Transfer taxes, stamp duty, transaction costs, homeownership, household mobility 
JEL Classifications: D23, H21, H27, J61, R21, R31, R38 
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1. Introduction
Most developed countries impose a tax on transactions of property and land. This tax – in 
North America often labelled ‘land transfer tax’ and in Britain ‘stamp duty’ – increases the 
transaction costs associated with the sale of a property and therefore increases the costs of 
moving for homeowners. This cost increase can be expected to negatively affect the 
propensity to move. Thus, the tax is prone to have adverse effects on housing and labor 
markets. Households may not live in the type of dwelling and the location that most closely 
match their preferences. Similarly, individuals may be less willing to accept new jobs that are 
not within commuting distance or they may decide to hold on to a current job that is a less 
good match than another available job further away. Given these potential adverse effects 
caused by mismatch in housing and labor markets, the question of whether, and to what 
extent, the tax reduces household mobility is highly policy relevant.  
Transfer taxes and in particular the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) – commonly referred 
to as ‘stamp duty’ – have long been criticized by economists as being inefficient. The 
Mirrlees Review (2011) highlights the fact that the SDLT “creates a disincentive for people 
to move house” (p. 403) and the adverse consequences of this on the functioning of housing 
and labor markets. To date, however, little is known about the nature of the moves (short vs. 
long distance or housing- vs. job-related) that are most strongly adversely affected. The 
present study sheds light on this question. 
The UK stamp duty scheme in place until December 3, 2014 provides an ideal setting to 
explore the impact of transfer taxes on mobility decisions. This is partly because the tax 
liability was quite substantial, at least for more expensive housing (the top rate until 
December 3, 2014 was 7 percent, levied on the entire purchase price), and partly because the 
stamp duty liability jumped sharply at various cut-off values, providing various 
‘discontinuities’ that can be exploited empirically.1 Our analysis focuses on a discontinuity –
or ‘notch’ – where the stamp duty jumps particularly strongly. This notch allows us to isolate 
the impact of the stamp duty from other determinants of mobility.  
We first formalize our basic economic intuition by adopting a bargaining model originally 
proposed by Besley et al. (2014). We then slightly modify the model by assuming that the 
seller derives some exogenous payoff from moving and this payoff is larger for more 
momentous – employment- or life event-related – mobility shocks than for more gradual 
changes in life-cycle circumstances – which typically move homeowners away incrementally 
from their optimal location and housing consumptions.. The framework yields three 
empirically testable predictions: (i) At the house value cut-off of £250k, as a consequence of 
the tax notch, household mobility should decrease; (ii) The adverse impact of the notch 
should be greater for (more incremental) short distance moves than for (more momentous) 
long distance ones; and (iii) The adverse effect should be greater for (more gradual) housing-
related than for (more momentous) job-related moves.  
1
 The reform from December 3, 2014 removed these discontinuities. 
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To test these predictions, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
compare homeowners with self-assessed house values on either side of the cut-off, while 
controlling for flexible but smooth functions of house values. Consistent with our theoretical 
priors, we find that the SDLT has a significant negative effect on household mobility. 
Moreover, this adverse effect is confined to short distance moves and to moves that are 
housing related. We find no significant effect on job-related moves and we find little 
evidence that the stamp duty adversely affects moves that are triggered by major ‘life events’ 
such as divorce or retirement. We document these key results both visually and using 
rigorous regression analysis. 
Our core estimates indicate that the 2 percentage-point increase in the SDLT reduces the 
annual rate of mobility by roughly 2.5 to 3 percentage points. This is a very substantive effect 
given that in the UK only about 5 percent of all owner-occupier households move each year. 
The corresponding welfare loss in the form of distortions in the housing market is very 
substantial. Based on our point estimates, back-of-the-envelope calculations imply that the 
welfare loss associated with the rate increase from 1 to 3 percent is between 36 and 47 
percent of the additional revenue generated by the tax increase. 
In conducting our analysis we faced a number of empirical challenges. Some of these are 
specific to our underlying data and the specifics of our Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
research design. One such concern is that homeowners who intend to stay may not follow the 
market closely and give rough rounded estimates of their house values. We address this 
concern by including dummy variables for round values and by conducting a number of 
placebo tests. The converse argument is that homeowners with higher underlying propensity 
to move may be better informed about the stamp duty and may therefore be more likely to 
report the cut-off value rather than a value slightly above (i.e., sorting of homeowners close 
to the cut-off could partially drive our findings). To address this potential issue, we drop 
households that self-report the cut-off value (or values very close to it). In a similar vein, 
recent movers may be disproportionally represented just below the cut-off. We thus remove 
such movers from our analysis. In all these cases, our key findings are unaltered.  
In addition, we carried out a battery of ‘standard checks’ for RD models such as ‘balancing 
tests’ (to check for sorting of households with different characteristics around the cut-off), 
dual clustering of standard errors at house value group level in addition to the household level 
(to address the issue that, de facto, the assignment variable is discrete), or estimation of more 
flexible specifications in which we allow the slope of the regression line to differ by 
treatment status. Our key findings are robust to all these checks. 
Overall, our results confirm the findings of the previous literature that transfer taxes are 
highly distortive in that they substantially reduce mobility. The main novel contribution of 
our study is that we demonstrate that these distortions are largely confined to short distance 
and housing-related moves.  
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Two strands of the economics literature motivate our analysis. The first strand is the existing 
literature on the impact of transfer taxes on household mobility. Transfer taxes are an 
important part of housing transaction/moving costs and they are the most important 
component directly determined by policy makers. Despite this, little is known about their 
effect on mobility. On the theoretical side, Lundborg and Skedinger (1999) modify 
Wheaton’s (1990) seminal search model of the housing market by adding transfer taxes into 
the framework. They derive that the lock-in effects of the tax reduce welfare, with the 
adverse effect being larger at low vacancy rates and smaller with a buyer tax. The latter is 
because the buyer tax-induced price reduction dampens the negative effect on search effort 
caused by the tax. Nordvik (2001) analyzes the mobility effects of transfer taxes in a 
theoretical dynamic life-cycle model of housing demand. He finds that a transfer tax rate of 
2.5 percent decreases the number of moves by the model household over the life cycle from 
three to one, implying a dead-weight loss of the transfer taxes in the region of between 17 and 
34 percent of the tax revenue. 
On the empirical side, Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn (2005) provide indirect evidence 
on the mobility effects of transfer taxes using individual panel data for the Netherlands. They 
estimate a competing risks hazard model of moving to renting or owning with house values 
as an explanatory variable and use a theoretical model to infer the effect of transaction costs. 
Their results suggest that a 1 percentage-point increase in the value of transaction costs—as a 
percentage of the value of the residence—decreases residential mobility rates by at least 8 
percent.  
Dachis et al. (2012) utilize the introduction of land transfer taxes in Toronto to estimate their 
effect on the housing transaction volume and prices with a Differences–in-Differences 
approach, comparing market outcomes across the boundary of the affected area.
2
 According 
to their estimates, a 1.1 percent land transfer tax led to a 15 percent decrease in transactions 
in the first eight months after the introduction. The implied welfare loss relative to an 
equivalent property tax is about $1 for every $8 in tax revenue. 
Discontinuities in transfer tax schedules have recently attracted increasing attention as a 
source of insight into how the tax affects market outcomes. Most closely related to the 
present paper, Best and Kleven (2015) utilize (i) administrative data on all property 
transactions in the UK, (ii) the discontinuities in the UK schedule to study price responses 
and (iii) changes in the tax schedule over time to study the effect on the transaction volume. 
Best and Kleven (2015) provide evidence of a strong negative price effect. In addition, they 
document that a temporary 1 percentage-point cut in the tax rate – due to the 2008-9 stamp 
duty holiday on houses worth between £125,001 and £175,000 – led to a 20 percent increase 
in transactions. The bulk of this impact is explained by a long term reduction in sales rather 
than the timing of purchases.  
                                                          
2
 See also Dachis (2012) for follow-up work using a longer data period. 
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Besley et al. (2014) exploit the same 2008-9 stamp duty holiday to estimate the incidence of 
a transaction tax on housing. Their key findings are twofold. First, around 60 percent of the 
“surplus” due to the tax holiday accrued to buyers. Second, the tax holiday increased 
transactions of properties by about 8 percent but this effect was only short-lived. The effect 
reversed rapidly after the policy was withdrawn.  
In a similar vein – exploiting a tax notch imposed by New York’s so called ‘mansion tax’ – 
Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) find robust evidence of substantial bunching (both buyers and 
sellers have strong incentives not to transact near the threshold). Moreover, they document 
that the incidence of the mansion tax falls on the seller, may exceed the value of the tax, and 
cannot be explained by tax evasion.  
Davidoff and Leigh (2013), finally, explore the incidence of transfer taxes using data from 
Australia where the marginal tax rate rather than the average tax rate jumps at various cut-off 
prices. They use past local house prices and national house price inflation to construct an 
instrumental variable for the transfer tax rate. Their results indicate that a higher tax rate 
reduces turnover and – in line with Kopczuk and Munroe’s findings (2015) – the incidence of 
the tax is on the seller.  
The second strand of the literature that motivates our analysis explores the link between 
homeownership and labor market outcomes. It is a well-established fact that homeownership 
induces significant barriers to mobility – transfer taxes are one important component of such 
barriers. In a seminal paper Oswald (1996) argues that homeownership, by reducing mobility, 
increases unemployment. Moreover, he provides cross-country evidence consistent with this 
conjecture. Subsequent studies (e.g., Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006 
and 2008; Battu et al., 2008) that use individual-level panel data and more rigorous 
estimating techniques, by and large, confirm Oswald’s conjecture that homeowners are less 
mobile. They rebut, however, the hypotheses that homeowners are more likely to become 
unemployed or have longer unemployment spells.
3
  
Coulson and Fisher (2009) explore a number of theoretical mechanisms that may affect the 
link between homeownership on the one hand and mobility and labor market outcomes on the 
other hand. They point out that different theoretical models can have very different 
predictions about the labor market at both micro and aggregate level. Their findings suggest 
that homeowners are less likely to be unemployed but they also have lower wages than 
renters. At the aggregate level, higher regional homeownership rates are associated with a 
greater probability of individual worker unemployment and higher wages.  
                                                          
3
 Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find no evidence that homeowners change jobs less than tenants. They 
conclude that the housing decision is driven by job commitment (and not the reverse) and that homeowners are 
less vulnerable to unemployment. Munch et al. (2006) point out that homeowners may set lower reservation 
wages for accepting jobs in the local labor market. Hence, they are more likely than renters to find jobs locally. 
Munch et al. (2008) have argued, from a search theoretic perspective, that homeowners should have a lower 
transition rate into new non-local jobs and therefore should stay longer in their jobs. Battu et al. (2008) suggest 
that there are differential effects across tenure types and that it matters whether the starting point is employment 
or unemployment. Their findings imply that homeownership is a constraint for the employed and public renting 
is more of a constraint for the unemployed. 
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Finally, Ferreira et al. (2010 and 2011) point out that there may be an asymmetry in the 
mobility response of homeowners depending on whether they are in negative equity. Whereas 
their findings indicate that homeowners in negative equity are indeed less likely to move, 
other empirical studies (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011; Coulson and Grieco, 2012) reach the 
conclusion that homeowners who are under water are slightly more likely to move than 
homeowners with positive equity. 
The general lesson learned from this literature is that policies that make households less 
mobile may harmfully affect the performance of housing and labor markets. Our study 
contributes to this literature by demonstrating that transfer taxes prevent moves driven by 
more incremental life cycle changes (such as short distance and housing-related mobility) but 
they do not preclude moves driven by more momentous shocks (long distance and job-related 
mobility). 
2. The UK stamp duty system and theoretical considerations 
The stamp duty on transactions on property and land was introduced in the UK during the 
1950s. We focus on the system of stamp duty on residential transactions that had been in 
place until December 3, 2014. 
The stamp duty is paid by the buyer and is a percentage share of the purchase price of the 
house. The economic incidence, however – in line with the literature discussed above – can 
be expected to mainly fall on the seller.  
The defining feature of the UK stamp duty system (i.e., the one in place until December 3, 
2014) is a progressive schedule where the tax rate for the whole purchase price goes up at 
certain thresholds. Table 1 reports the tax schedule that applies during our sample period: 
Houses sold for up to 125,000 are exempt from stamp duty, but from £125,000 upwards the 
tax rate rises in a stepwise manner from 1 to 5 percent.
4
  
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the purchase price and stamp duty liabilities. Our 
empirical analysis focuses on the second cut-off at £250,000 where the tax rate increases 
from 1 to 3 percent. We do so because stamp duty payable increases significantly at the cut-
off (from £2,500 to £7,500)
5
, and because our data is reasonably dense around the £250k cut-
off.
6
 Significant variation in stamp duty liabilities and large sample size together make it 
possible to detect the effects of the stamp duty on mobility. 
  
                                                          
4
 A new higher “mansion” tax rate of 7 percent (or 15 percent for corporate bodies) was introduced for 
properties over £2 million on 22 March 2012. A tax ‘holiday’ was in place on properties worth between £125 
and £175 during 2008-9. None of these changes affected the notch we investigate. 
5
 At the £125k the treatment is much weaker as the tax liability rises only by £1,250.   
6
 Lack of density around the cut-offs rules out using the thresholds of £500k and £1m. We also note that while 
the jumps in tax liability are £5k and £10k, respectively, for these two cut-offs, these jumps are smaller in 
‘relative terms’ as only fairly high income and wealthy households will be able to afford to buy houses worth 
over £500k and especially over £1m.  
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FIGURE 1 
Purchase price and stamp duty 
 
Transfer taxes such as the British stamp duty drive a wedge between the price obtained by the 
seller and the price paid by the buyer and basic economic intuition suggests that these 
transaction costs will result in fewer housing transactions.
7
 We can formalize this basic 
intuition and derive theoretical predictions by adopting and slightly modifying a bargaining 
model originally proposed by Besley et al. (2014).
8
  
The setting consists of a buyer and a seller that are matched. The buyer has a valuation 𝑉 of 
the seller’s house. The seller’s valuation is 𝑢. Thus, we can denote the difference between the 
buyer’s and the seller’s valuation as 𝑉 − 𝑢 = 𝜀. The transfer tax rate is 𝜏 ∈ {0, 𝑡}.  
Buyer and seller bargain over the agreed transaction price 𝑝, which is generated by a 
generalized Nash bargaining solution.
9
 In such a setting, as Besley et al. (2014) derive 
formally, transactions only occur if: 
                                                          
7
 To the extent that households who consider moving need the sales proceeds for their next down-payment or do 
not want to become a landlord and rent out their existing home, we would expect that the transfer tax also 
reduces household mobility. Moreover, in addition to the effect on the mobility of homeowners, the transfer tax 
may also affect the propensity that households choose to become homeowners (and, possibly, the aggregate 
housing consumption over the life cycle). Households (especially those with a short expected duration) can be 
expected to become renters because the moving costs are high. The effect of the transfer tax on tenure choice is 
a question that should be explored in future work. 
8
 We follow the notation of Besley et al. (2014) for ease of comparison. For the full derivation of equation (1) 
we refer the interested reader to the seminal paper. 
9
 We assume that the house will not resell. If we were to more realistically assume that a resale is possible, the 
transfer tax could be more than fully capitalized into property values. Our theoretical considerations also 
abstract from the fact that sellers may not only care about the sales price but also about the property’s expected 
time-on-the-market, which signifies an opportunity cost to them. The existence of such opportunity costs may 
reduce the sharpness of the discontinuity in our empirical design. During our sample period, however, the 
median time on the market was quite short (see: http://www.hometrack.co.uk/our-insight/monthly-national-
house-price-survey/time-to-sell-over-three-months-across-a-third-of-the-country; last accessed on 5/29/2012). 
Moreover, property sales in the UK are time-consuming mainly due to a complicated legal procedure that takes 
roughly 12 weeks irrespective of the ‘attractiveness’ of the asking price (see e.g., http://www.home.co.uk/ 
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 𝜀 − 𝑢𝜏 > 0. (1) 
Equation (1) implies that the buyer’s excess valuation of the seller’s house 𝜀 must be 
sufficiently large to overcome the transaction cost imposed by the transfer tax. In other 
words, the transfer tax drives a wedge between the buyer’s and the seller’s valuation.  
Let us denote the ‘excess margin’ of a transaction as 
  𝑘 = 𝜀 − 𝑢𝜏, (2) 
with the transaction (move) occurring only if 𝑘 > 0. 
From equation (2) we can easily derive that 
 
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝜏
= −𝑢 < 0. (3) 
We can formulate our first proposition: 
PROPOSITION 1. The propensity of a transaction (move) occurring is a decreasing function 
of the transfer tax rate. 
We further assume that the seller derives some exogenous payoff 𝜋 from moving (swiftly) 
and that this payoff affects the seller’s valuation of the property 𝑢(𝜋). If a household receives 
a job-related mobility shock (with a better offer in a different labor market), the payoff 𝜋 of a 
(swift) move will likely be large, thus significantly lowering the seller’s valuation of the 
property. This is because typically (i) a good job offer that poses a high payoff is valid only 
for a short period of time and (ii) the seller needs the down-payment for the new house so 
needs to sell quickly. A similar argument applies for a negative labor related mobility shock. 
If homeowners become unemployed and have to search for new jobs, they are under greater 
pressure to sell their homes quickly. 
If, on the contrary, a household contemplates an incremental change in housing consumption 
(e.g., a young growing family considers expanding by moving to a larger house in the same 
school catchment area or an elderly homeowner ponders down-sizing by moving to a smaller 
apartment in the same neighborhood) this will typically yield a small(er) payoff 𝜋 associated 
with the move.
10
 Since the sellers intend to move locally and the opportunity cost of staying 
put are not very high, they may only lower their valuation 𝑢 slightly. Following the logic of 
this line of reasoning, we can assume that 
 
𝜕𝑢(𝜋)
𝜕𝜋
< 0. (4) 
Using (2) and substituting  𝜀 = 𝑉 − 𝑢, we can write 
  𝑘 = 𝑉 − 𝑢(𝜋) − 𝑢(𝜋)𝜏, (5) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
guides/buying/; last accessed on 8/24/2015). Hence, the discontinuity at the cut-off can be expected to persist 
even when endogenous time-on-the-market is taken into account. 
10
 That is, the discrepancy between actual and optimal consumption in terms of quantity and location is smaller.  
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Differentiating 𝑘 with respect to 𝜏 we obtain 
 
𝜕𝑘
𝜕𝜏
= −𝑢(𝜋). (6) 
If we finally differentiate 𝜕𝑘 𝜕𝜏⁄  with respect to 𝜋, we get 
 
𝜕𝑘 𝜕𝜏⁄
𝜕𝜋
= −
𝜕𝑢(𝜋)
𝜕𝜋
. (7) 
We argued above that 𝜕𝑢(𝜋)/𝜕𝜋  < 0, hence we can state 
 
𝜕𝑘 𝜕𝜏⁄
𝜕𝜋
= −
𝜕𝑢(𝜋)
𝜕𝜋
> 0. (7.1) 
Our second proposition is thus: 
PROPOSITION 2. The likelihood that a given increase in the transfer tax rate leads to a 
positive ‘excess margin’ (i.e., does not prevent a transaction/move) will be greater for 
homeowners who contemplate a move with a greater expected payoff  𝜋.  
The above theoretical considerations yield three empirically testable predictions. Our main 
prediction (Prediction 1) follows directly from PROPOSITION 1: At the house value cut-off of 
£250k, as a consequence of the stamp duty tax notch, household mobility should decrease.  
We would expect the magnitude of this adverse effect to depend on household specific 
circumstances (i.e., the underlying reason and expected payoff of the move). Following the 
line of reasoning above and PROPOSITION 2, we would expect that homeowners who face 
gradual changes in their life-cycle circumstances – which move them away incrementally 
from their optimal housing consumptions and locations –  will be discouraged more strongly 
from moving, as a consequence of the stamp duty notch, than homeowners who face more 
momentous – typically employment related – mobility shocks. With respect to our empirical 
analysis; the adverse impact of the stamp duty tax notch should be greater for (i) short 
distance compared to long distance moves (Prediction 2) and (ii) housing-related compared 
to job-related moves (Prediction 3).  
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data 
The data used in this study is derived from the BHPS. The BHPS follows roughly 10,000 
households over time. We use data from 1996 to 2008, which is the last year available.
11
 The 
surveys for each wave are conducted between September and March. We define our ‘year’ 
variable as the year when data collection started.  
In addition to a rich set of household characteristics, the dataset includes the owner-
occupiers’ assessments of the value of their homes and information on whether the household 
                                                          
11
 The BHPS was subsequently replaced by the Understanding Society survey and there was a break in the 
panel. 
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moved in the subsequent year, making it an ideal dataset to study the impact of transfer taxes 
on household mobility. The exact question on which the self-assessed house value is based is: 
“About how much would you expect to get for your home if you sold it today?” If the 
household gives a range, the interviewer will report the lowest figure in that range. 
In our empirical analysis we essentially compare households reporting house values above 
the 250k cut-off, where the stamp duty tax rate jumps from 1 to 3 percent, with households 
with self-reported values below the cut-off. We limit the sample to owner-occupiers with 
self-assessed house values within 20, 30 or 40 percent bands around the £250k cut-off.  
One limitation of our analysis is that the mobility status of the last wave (2008) is not known. 
Thus, the estimation sample consists of data from 1996 to 2007. Finally, we are concerned 
that recent movers may bias our results. Because many houses sell at and just below £250k, 
recent movers are disproportionately represented just below the cut-off. To the extent that the 
recent mover status affects mobility, this may bias our estimates. Moreover, recent movers 
may be problematic for our research design in the sense that they can precisely choose the 
value of their house. Their ability to “precisely manipulate” the assignment variable can 
invalidate the RD design. Due to these issues, we exclude households that moved into their 
current dwelling between year t-1 and t.  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of self-assessed house values in 2006. Overall, people tend to 
report round values divisible by £50k. There is a clear spike at £250k, but this spike does not 
stand out from the other round values. It is clearly much more pronounced in the transaction 
price distribution depicted in Figure 3. The fact that there is no abnormal pile-up at the cut-
off in Figure 2 supports the validity of our RD design. 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of actual transaction prices in the UK in 2006 from a data 
set obtained from the Land Registry. We expect to observe a pile-up in the transaction price 
distribution at £250k because houses that would sell for up to £255k absent of the tax rate 
notch will sell for £250k. This is indeed what Figure 3 reveals.
12
  
                                                          
12
 Basic economic intuition suggests that the price distribution right of the cut-off should move left and the 
distribution should continue smoothly after the cut-off. However, Figure 3 shows a dip in the distribution 
immediately right of the cut-off. Very few properties sell at £251k – £255k. The possibility to avoid taxes by 
selling fixtures and fittings separately at excessive prices is a possible explanation for this dip. Even though the 
SDLT system introduced in 2003 made such tax avoidance harder, it is likely that close to the cut-off people are 
more prone to engage in tax avoidance, even by unlawful means, because just above the cut-off, the expected 
benefits of trying to bring down the declared purchase price may exceed the cost associated with the risk of 
getting caught. 
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FIGURE 2 
Distribution of self-assessed house values in 2006 (excluding recent movers) 
 
FIGURE 3 
Housing transaction prices in the UK in 2006   
 
0
2
0
0
4
0
0
6
0
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Self assessed house value
0
2
.0
e
+
0
4
4
.0
e
+
0
4
6
.0
e
+
0
4
8
.0
e
+
0
4
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000
Price of property
  
11 
 
Treatment variable 
Our treatment variable is a dummy that equals one if the self-assessed house value of 
household i in year t-1 exceeds £250k, Treatit-1 = D(House valueit-1 > 250k). We argue that 
the likelihood that the household’s moving decision is affected by the 3 percent tax rate rather 
than the 1 percent rate increases drastically at, or in the vicinity, of this point. The self-
assessed value may not be an accurate measure of the actual value when a house is sold. 
However, the self-assessed value is arguably more relevant for our purposes as households’ 
expectations regarding stamp duty payable upon sale are likely based on the self-assessed 
house value.  
Outcome variable 
Our outcome variable measures actual moves between the interview date and the subsequent 
interview. The variable move gets the value one if the BHPS records classify the household as 
a mover household in t. We lose some observations due to attrition from the panel between t-
1 and t but we were able to recover the value of the moving indicator for some non-
respondent households by utilizing information in the sample record files of the BHPS. In 
addition to the overall mobility, we study different types of mobility separately by using 
information on the distance of move and main reasons of moving. 
We argue that a direct measure of household mobility is preferable to measures of housing 
transactions, used in most previous studies, when the interest is on the potential adverse 
impact of the transfer tax on the functioning of housing and labor markets. One crucial 
advantage of the BHPS with respect to our core research question is that it allows us to gain 
insight into the effects of transfer taxes by analyzing different types of moves. 
Round values  
Exploring the data suggests that households that report round house values divisible by £50k 
(£150k, £200k etc.) have a lower propensity to move. One might be concerned that 
households intending to stay do not follow the market as closely and give rough rounded 
estimates of the value of their house. The round value effect might bias our estimates if 
disproportionately many round values are in the treatment or the control group. To address 
this issue, we include a dummy variable for round house values divisible by £50k in the 
model as a control variable. 
Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis for the 
largest regression sample (40 percent band around the cut-off). The average house value in 
the sample is £220,000 and 4.6 percent of households moved within a year. To analyze 
whether different types of moves are differentially affected, we divide moves into two 
categories based on the distance of move: less than 10km, and 10km or more. In addition, we 
use information about the main reason for the move to construct three categories: ‘housing 
and area related’, ‘employment related’ and ‘life-event related’. The categories are described 
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in detail in Appendix Table A1. Housing- and area-related reasons are most common. Moves 
motivated mainly by job-related reasons seem to be rare. This may partly reflect how the 
survey question is formulated. Employment motives may still be important even if they are 
not the main reason for the move. Moving distance and main reason for move being 
employment related are strongly positively correlated and we think that by analyzing the 
distance of move we can gain additional insight into whether transfer taxes hinder relocation 
of the workforce. Less than one percent of short distance moves (less than 10km) but about 
11 percent of moves beyond 10km are mainly job related. Similarly, 56 percent of short 
distance moves but only 27 percent of long distance moves are mainly housing related. Life-
event related mobility is not strongly correlated with the distance of move. 
3.2. Empirical specification 
We use regression analysis to estimate the impact of an increase in the stamp duty rate on the 
propensity to move of owner-occupier households. The estimation of the effect of the stamp 
duty is challenging because stamp duty liabilities are likely to be correlated with other factors 
that affect mobility. However, the fact that the stamp duty rate for the whole property jumps 
at certain cut-off points can be used to identify the impact of the stamp duty. More 
specifically, we use the RD method discussed in Lee and Lemieux (2010). The idea is to 
compare mobility rates below the £250k cut-off point, where the stamp duty amount 
increases sharply, with the moving probability of households above the cut-off . We estimate 
a regression model of a mobility dummy on a dummy for being above the cut-off and include 
a flexible but smooth function of house values in the set of control variables. The house value 
variables pick up the impact of all determinants of mobility correlated with house values, 
apart from the stamp duty. Hence, we obtain a reliable estimate of the effect of the stamp 
duty on mobility clean from confounding factors that might otherwise bias our estimates. 
We estimate by OLS a reduced form model, evaluating the mobility effect of being above the 
£250k threshold compared with the effect below. Specifically, we estimate: 
 Moveit = βt+ β1Treatit-1+ f(House Valueit-1)+ uit , (model 1) 
where the dependent variable Moveit is the mobility indicator that gets the value one if 
household i moved between t – 1 and t. The treatment variable takes the value one if the 
household’s self-assessed house value exceeds £250k. The function f(House Valueit-1) is a 1
st
 
– 4th order polynomial of the self-assessed house value. In addition, we test the robustness of 
the results to allowing for different polynomials on either side of the cut-off. To facilitate 
comparability of the treatment and control groups, we limit the data to 20, 30 or 40 percent 
bands around the cut-off. 
The identifying assumption of the model is that other determinants of mobility develop 
smoothly with respect to house values and are therefore captured by the f function. The 
ability of households to precisely manipulate whether they are to the right or to the left of the 
cut-off would invalidate the design. Manipulation of the self-assessed value is naturally 
possible but households do not have incentives to misreport in the BHPS survey. 
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Manipulation of the actual value of the house may be possible too by, for example, neglecting 
renovation. However, local demand and supply conditions are the main drivers of house 
prices and therefore precise manipulation is impossible. The fact that there is no abnormal 
mass in self assessed house values below the cut-off in Figure 2 suggests that manipulation is 
not a major concern.
13
 
If all households respond similarly to the stamp duty, our results for the £250k cut-off can be 
generalized to apply for the whole population in the UK and possibly tell us something about 
the effects of similar taxes in other countries as well. With heterogeneous responses, the 
results may apply to a smaller sub-population. Drawing on Lee and Lemieux (2010), our 
estimates can be interpreted as a weighted average of treatment effects of the British owner-
occupier households in the BHPS data. The weight of each household is the probability that 
their self-assessed house value falls within the band around the cut-off used in each 
specification we estimate.  
Our empirical results may be affected by the fact that we cannot be sure whether all 
households reporting house values above the limit are affected by the 3 percent tax rate (or 
whether households below the limit are affected by the 1 percent tax rate). Thus the treatment 
group indicator likely measures actual treatment status with error which leads to attenuation 
bias towards zero.
14
 
The panel property of the data and the lumpiness of the distribution of self-assessed house 
values have potential implications for statistical inference. Firstly, since the households in our 
sample are observed in multiple years, we have to account for within household correlation of 
the error terms. We thus cluster the error terms at the household level in our base 
specification. Another potential issue regarding statistical inference was pointed out by Lee 
and Card (2008), who discuss RD analysis with a discrete assignment variable. They argue 
that specification errors in the fitted regression line imply that at each discrete value there is 
an error component positively correlated within observations at that particular point, which 
means that standard errors are downward biased. They show that clustering standard errors by 
the values of the discrete assignment variable solves the problem. In principle, the self-
assessed house value is a continuous variable and in the BHPS data there are observations at 
147 different self-reported values within the broadest house value band we use (£150k – 
£350k). However, 97.7 percent of the observations are concentrated at values divisible by 
£5k. We construct a new house value variable by rounding house values up to the closest 
value divisible by £5k and use it as an alternative assignment variable in a robustness check 
where we cluster standard errors at the house value group level in addition to the household 
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 McCrary (2008) type formal tests of discontinuity in the distribution of house values are not suitable with our 
data. This is because the strong concentration of the data in round values could be erroneously interpreted as 
manipulation. 
14
 Our empirical model can be interpreted as a reduced form of a fuzzy RD design. Standard fuzzy RD analysis 
uses a discontinuity in the likelihood of obtaining the treatment as an instrument for the actual treatment status 
in a Two-Stage-Least-Squares regression. This approach is not feasible with the BHPS data because there is no 
way to identify the treated households with certainty. 
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level. Clustering at all of the 147 discrete values is not feasible because of very few 
observations at several non-round values. Clustering at the house value group level may be 
problematic with the samples using the 20 percent bands around the £250k cut-off because 
the number of clusters is limited. However, with the 40 percent band, and possibly with the 
30 percent band, the number of house value clusters is reasonably large (40 or 30 clusters). 
This robustness check indicates to what extent standard errors clustered only at the household 
level are likely to be downward biased. 
3.3. Results 
We start with results on the impact of the stamp duty increase on observed household 
mobility. Figure 4 provides a descriptive analysis of mobility and illustrates our econometric 
results. The circles in Figure 4 depict the mobility rate for £10k wide house value groups. The 
size of the circle is proportionate to the number of observations in the group. The red line 
shows predicted mobility from model (1) with a 4
th
 order polynomial of house value, and the 
band around it represents the 95% confidence interval. Consistent with our PROPOSITION 1 
(and Prediction 1), the figure reveals that there is a clear downward shift in moving 
probability when the self-assessed house value exceeds £250k.  
FIGURE 4 
Mobility and self-assessed house values 
 
Notes: Circles indicate mobility rate in £10k bins after controlling for round values 
divisible by £50k. The size of the circle is proportionate to the number of observations 
in the bin. The line shows predicted mobility from a regression of a mover dummy on 
a dummy for self-assessed house value above £250k, a 4
th
 order polynomial for the 
whole range and a dummy for round values divisible by £50k.  
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Table 3 presents the corresponding estimates of the effect of the stamp duty with various 
specifications. Columns 1 – 4 report the results with 1st – 4th order polynomials of house 
value. Rows 1 – 3 use 20, 30 and 40 percent bands around the £250k cut-off. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) is shown in italics to assist specification selection (low values 
preferred).  
The coefficient on the treatment indicator is negative in all specifications. With the +/-20 
percent band, the estimates are insignificant and vary from -0.012 to -0.034. Using a wider 
band makes the estimates more stable and decreases the standard errors substantially. With 
the 30 percent band, the estimates vary from -0.025 to -0.031 and are highly significant. In 
row 3, using a 40 percent band around the cut-off, results are similar to the second row. We 
take the specification with the 30 percent band and the 3
rd
 order polynomial of house values 
as our preferred specification. The band is wide enough for reasonably precise estimation but 
does not use data overly far from the cut-off. The 3
rd
 order polynomial is preferred because 
adding further polynomials increases the AIC score. Taken at face value, the point estimate of 
our preferred specification implies that the 2 percentage-point increase in the stamp duty rate 
reduces the propensity to move by about 2.5 percentage-points in absolute terms or by 35 
percent in relative terms.
15
 Most of our results are very similar with the 30 percent and 40 
percent band, and in the figures describing mobility rates in £10k house value groups and 
illustrating the effect of the stamp duty, we use the 40 percent band (covering the whole 
range) and a fourth order polynomial. 
The various point estimates vary around our preferred estimate with the attached standard 
errors also varying around the standard error of the preferred estimate. Overall, our results 
provide strong supporting evidence that an increase in the stamp duty has a significant 
negative effect on household mobility.  
Distance and type of moves 
In the analysis that follows we explore our PROPOSITION 2, which implies that a given 
increase in the stamp duty should reduce mobility more strongly for homeowners who face 
gradual changes in their life-cycle circumstances as opposed to momentous shocks.  
In Figures 5a and 5b, we explore the proposition that an increase in the stamp duty tax rate 
more strongly adversely affects short distance moves (Prediction 2). We divide moves into 
two groups based on the straight line distance of move: less than 10 kilometers and over 10 
kilometers. The shares of these groups in our sample of moves are 56 percent, and 44 percent. 
Figure 5a illustrates that there is a clear downward shift in short distance mobility at the cut-
off, but in Figure 5b (long distance mobility) no such drop is seen, consistent with our 
theoretical considerations. 
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 The relative decrease in propensity to move was calculated by comparing the treatment effect estimate (2.5 
percentage points) in our preferred model specification to the predicted moving propensity (7.2 percentage 
points) in the treatment group absent of the treatment. The relative reduction in mobility is 2.5/7.2 = 34.7 
percent, or, with a treatment effect estimate of 3.0 percentage points; 41.7 percent 
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Table 4 presents the corresponding econometric results for short and long distance moves 
with 20, 30 and 40 percent bands around the cutoff and 3
rd
 and 4
th
 order polynomials. The 
treatment effect estimates on short distance moves (columns 1 and 2) are negative and highly 
significant in all specifications, apart from the 20 percent band with a 4
th
 order polynomial. 
The impact on long distance mobility (3
rd
 and 4
th
 columns) is close to zero and insignificant 
in all specifications. 
The results imply that the overall effect found in Table 3 is solely driven by short distance 
mobility (less than 10km). Long distance mobility appears to be unaffected by the stamp 
duty. Our explanation for this finding is that short distance mobility is closely linked to 
incremental adjustments of housing consumption. A 2 percentage point increase in the stamp 
duty may outweigh the benefits of typical incremental housing consumption adjustments, 
such as buying one room more or less, but it may not outweigh the benefits associated with 
long distance moves. The latter are typically related to other important decisions, such as 
changes in employment or family status.
16
  
FIGURE 5a 
Short distance (<10km) mobility and self-assessed house values 
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 Consistent with this conjecture, Buck (2000) finds that job-related moves in the UK tend to be over longer 
distances (across rather than within Local Authority Districts). 
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FIGURE 5b 
Long distance (>10km) mobility and self-assessed house value 
 
 
In Figures 6a-c, we explore the proposition that the stamp duty has a stronger impact on 
housing-related mobility than on mobility triggered by employment reasons or on major life-
events (Prediction 3). We use information on the primary reason for moving to divide moves 
into three groups: 1) housing and area related, 2) employment related, and 3) major life event 
related. Table A1 describes how we have constructed the categories. The share of moves 
mainly motivated by job-related reasons is only about 5 percent, which makes it difficult to 
identify a separate effect on job-motivated moves. This issue notwithstanding, the figures are 
in line with our interpretation of the distance-of-move results in Table 4. There is a visible 
drop in mobility at the cut-off in Figure 6a (housing- and area-related mobility). 
Employment-related mobility (Figure 6b) and major life event-related mobility (Figure 6c) 
seem to be unaffected by the increase in stamp duty. 
The corresponding regression results for different types of mobility are presented in Table 5. 
Coefficients for housing- and area-motivated moves are always negative and highly 
statistically significant with 30 and 40 percent bands. The coefficients for job-related moves 
are close to zero and insignificant, consistent with our theoretical considerations discussed in 
Section 2. The results for life event related mobility are less clear. The coefficient is negative 
and significant in two of the six specifications, indicating that part of the negative mobility 
effect of the stamp duty may be attributable to a reduction in this kind of moves.  
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FIGURE 6a 
Housing and area related mobility and self-assessed house values 
 
 
FIGURE 6b 
Employment related mobility and self-assessed house values 
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FIGURE 6c 
Major life event related mobility and self-assessed house values 
 
Validity tests and robustness checks 
A standard way of testing the validity of the RD design is to check if predetermined 
characteristics of households change significantly at the cut-off. If the flexible but smooth 
function of the assignment variable (self-assessed house values in our case) adequately 
captures other relevant factors, we should not observe changes in background characteristics 
of households at the cut-off. To test this, we estimate model (1) using several observed 
determinants of mobility as the dependent variable. The variables used are: the age of the 
household head, dummy for kids, household income, two indicators of education (GCE A-
levels or higher and bachelor degree or higher), a dummy for the household head being 
unemployed, and commute time in minutes. Significant coefficients in these ‘balancing tests’ 
would suggest that the model specification is not sufficiently flexible to control for other 
determinants of mobility, or that households with different characteristics sort into different 
sides of the cut-off, which could invalidate the research design. The balancing tests for 
education are particularly important because in addition to being related to mobility, 
education may also be related to how well the household knows the stamp duty system. 
Table 6 presents the results of the balancing tests with a 3
rd
 order polynomial of house values 
in Panel A and a 4
th
 order polynomial in Panel B. Panel A, indicates that income, the 
likelihood of having children, education, and the commute time are not correlated with the 
treatment variable. In the specification with the 40 percent band, age is statistically 
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significantly higher in the treatment group. However, when we add the 4th order term of 
house values in Panel B, the coefficient becomes insignificant even with the 40 percent band.  
As an additional test of whether our results might be driven by confounding factors correlated 
with the treatment indicator we include age, a dummy for kids, log of household income, a 
dummy for GCE A-levels or higher, a dummy for bachelor degree or higher, a dummy for 
being unemployed and region dummies (19 regions) as control variables in model (1).
17
 Table 
7 presents the results. The coefficients on the treatment indicator are very similar to the 
specifications without the additional controls in Table 3. This increases our confidence in the 
finding that the stamp duty decreases mobility. The robustness of the results to observed 
determinants of mobility suggests that unobserved omitted variables are unlikely to bias our 
estimates significantly. 
We carried out a number of additional robustness checks, the results of which we report in 
various Appendix Tables. To begin with, a potential concern related to basing the analysis on 
self-assessed house values is that households with high underlying propensity to move may 
be better informed about the stamp duty and may therefore be more likely to report £250k 
rather than slightly above £250k. As a test for whether possible sorting of households close to 
the cut-off might drive our results, we re-estimated the model dropping all households that 
self-report exactly £250k, £245k–£255k or £240k–£260k, respectively. We use the 40 percent 
band because otherwise the remaining sample size is small. The results reported in Appendix 
Table A2 are similar to Table 3 (last row) despite losing many observations. Our findings 
survive even when we limit the sample to households who say they are willing to move. In 
this subsample, sorting on unobserved propensity to move should not be a problem. The 
results are shown in Appendix Table A3. 
In our base specification, we fit the same polynomial over the whole range of house values 
and only allow the intercept to change at the cut-off. Restricting the polynomials to be the 
same on both sides of the cut-off can be considered intuitively unappealing, because it 
implies that we use data on the right of the cut-off to estimate the function on the left, and 
vice versa. We therefore estimate a more flexible specification in which we allow the slope of 
the regression line to differ by treatment status. That is, we estimate the coefficients on the n
th
 
order polynomials of house values separately for the sample below and above the cut-off. We 
report results with 1
st
 and 2
nd
 order polynomials of house values, so that the maximum 
number of parameters used is the same as in our base specification. The results are reported 
in Appendix Table A4. Again, all estimates are negative and some of them are statistically 
significant. As expected, the standard errors go up in some specifications, especially with the 
2
nd
 order polynomial. 
Another concern is that our results might be driven by some irregularities related to the 
reporting of house values around round numbers. In order to test this possibility, we run 
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 The list of controls in Table 7 does not include commute time because there are too many missing 
observations (see Table 2). However, reassuringly, the results in Table 6 indicate that commute time is not 
correlated with the treatment variable. 
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placebo tests with 8 artificial cut-offs set at £150k, £175k, £200k, £225, £275k, £300k, 
£325k, and £350k. We focus on specifications that use a 30 percent band around the cut-off 
and a 3
rd
 order polynomial of house values, and a 40 percent band with a 4
th
 order 
polynomial. The results are shown in Appendix Figures A1 and A2. None of the eight 
placebo tests gives a negative and significant coefficient. The fact that our method does not 
give significant negative coefficients at artificial cut-offs increases our confidence in the 
finding that the decrease in mobility at £250k is indeed caused by the 2 percentage-point 
increase in the stamp duty at the cut-off.  
Finally, standard errors in Table 3 are clustered at the household level to make them robust 
for correlation in the error term within household. As discussed in Section 3.2., the error 
terms may, in addition, be correlated within different self-assessed house values. In Appendix 
Table A5 we report the results with the 30 percent and 40 percent bands using £5k wide 
house value groups as the assignment variable and two-way clustering. The coefficients on 
the treatment indicator in Appendix Table A5 are almost identical to those in Table 3. A 
comparison of standard errors in Appendix Table A5 with the standard errors in Table 3 (30 
and 40 percent bands) suggests that the one-way clustered standard errors in Table 3 are only 
slightly downward biased. Two-way clustering increases standard errors by around 0.002 
depending on the specification. With the 40 percent band, significance of some of the 
coefficients decreases but with the 30 percent band the significance levels do not change. 
4. Conclusions 
The previous literature suggests two main channels through which transfer taxes on property 
may have detrimental effects on the functioning of the economy. Firstly, by increasing 
moving costs, the transfer tax may deter the unemployed from taking up jobs far from their 
residence or workers from switching to more productive jobs. Secondly, the transfer tax can 
make households tolerate larger discrepancies between the characteristics of their actual and 
the desired dwelling before moving. As a result, the match between dwellings and households 
is on average worse than in the absence of the tax. The increased mismatch on the housing 
market may lead to ‘waste’ in the form of misallocation costs due to, for example, large 
households living in too small apartments and small households living in too large apartments 
simply because the transfer tax associated with moving outweighs the benefits of moving.  
The transfer tax induced increase in moving costs will only have these adverse effects if it 
actually reduces mobility. Our core estimates indicate that a 2 percentage-point increase in 
the British stamp duty indeed reduces household mobility considerably; by 2.5 to 3 
percentage points
18
, implying a reduction in mobility of 35 to 42 percent.  
Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the implied welfare loss associated with this 
reduction is substantial. If we assume a uniform distribution of the benefits of moving 
between 0 and £5k, our calculations – based on our core estimates – imply a welfare loss 
associated with the reduction of mobility of between 36 and 47 percent of the additional 
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 This range is based on the 30 percent band around the cut-off and 1
st
 to 4
th
 order polynomials in Table 3. 
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revenue generated by the tax rate increase.
19
 This is about three times as high as the estimated 
welfare loss in Dachis et al. (2012) but of a similar magnitude as in the model simulations of 
Nordvik (2001). 
Our analysis of short and long distance moves indicates that the effect is solely attributable to 
the stamp duty’s adverse impact on short distance moves, which are typically related to 
adjustments in housing consumption. This implies that the stamp duty may lead 
predominately to misallocation of dwellings in the housing market. Its impact on the 
functioning of the labor market may be fairly limited.  
One interesting feature of the British housing market is the fact that owner-occupier moves 
are comparably rare. During our sample period (1996 to 2007) and based on the full BHPS 
sample (not just our regression sample), the average propensity of a UK owner-occupier 
household to move during a calendar year was only 5.1 percent. This contrasts to the 
household mobility in the United States. Owner-occupier households in the US were more 
than twice as likely to move during our sample period: Based on the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) the propensity of US owner-occupier households to move during a 
calendar year was on average 11.5 percent. Both, UK and US owner-occupier households 
face housing transfer taxes, though in most US states and municipalities this tax is not very 
substantial. According to our findings, differences in the transfer tax rates alone cannot fully 
explain this difference in mobility rates. In 2007 the average stamp duty rate faced by 
homeowners in the UK was 1.25% (based on the BHPS). A simple application of our 
preferred point estimate to all homeowners suggests that eliminating the stamp duty in the 
UK would increase mobility by 1.4 percentage-points to 6.5%, which is still much lower than 
the mobility rate for owner-occupiers in the US. 
Given the magnitude of the negative effect of the British stamp duty, particularly on short 
distance and housing-related mobility, we conclude that transfer taxes likely have very 
substantial detrimental effects on the functioning of the housing market. This implies that 
transfer taxes on residential properties are an inefficient way of collecting tax revenue. Taxes 
on land (and housing) consumption that apply independently of whether a household moves 
also have real property as the basis of taxation but are less distorting. 
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 In our data the mobility rate in the treatment group is 0.047 (40 percent band). The mobility rate in the 
absence of the tax rate hike is 0.047 plus the estimated effect. Assuming a 2.5 percentage point effect for the tax 
rate increase implies a counterfactual mobility rate of 0.072. Denote the number of potential movers in the 
treatment group by 𝑀 and assume each house sells for 𝑉. The additional revenue due to the tax rate increase 
from 1 to 3 percent is 0.03 × 𝑉 × 0.047 × 𝑀 − 0.01 × 𝑉 × 0.072 × 𝑀. Assuming the welfare loss from the 
prevented moves is half of the increase in moving costs due to the tax rate increase, we get that the additional 
welfare loss is 0.025 ×  𝑀 ×  (0.02 ×  𝑉)/2. Thus the welfare loss is 36 percent of the additional revenue. 
Assuming a 3.0 percentage point effect of the tax rate increase on the mobility rate, we obtain a counterfactual 
mobility rate of 0.077. Replicating the calculations from above, this implies a welfare loss of 47 percent of the 
additional revenue. 
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Stamp duty schedule – During sample period 
Purchase price Stamp duty rate 
Up to £125,000 0% 
Over £125,000 to £250,000 1% 
Over £250,000 to £500,000 3% 
Over £500,000 to £1 million 4% 
Over £1 million 5% 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary statistics – 40 percent band around £250k cut-off 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
House value 21737 219.5 47.5 
Moved between t and t+1 21737 0.046 0.210 
Distance of move less than 10 km 21737 0.025 0.156 
Distance of move 10km or more 21737 0.021 0.144 
Moved mainly for employment reasons 21737 0.002 0.050 
Moved mainly for housing or area reasons 21737 0.020 0.140 
Moved mainly for life-event reasons 21737 0.015 0.122 
Round house value (£200k, £250k or £300k) 21737 0.353 0.478 
Children (0/1) 21737 0.327 0.469 
Annual household income 21303 38122 26743 
Age 21434 52.7 14.3 
General Certificate of Education (GCE) A-levels or higher 20952 0.643 0.479 
Bachelor degree or higher 20952 0.203 0.402 
Unemployed 21735 0.009 0.095 
Commute time in minutes 10683 26.7 22.8 
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TABLE 3 
Stamp duty and mobility 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.012 -0.025 -0.034 -0.017 7592 
 
[0.017] [0.018] [0.026] [0.027] 
 
 
-1213 -1219 -1217 -1218 
 30 % -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.025*** -0.028*** 16848 
 
[0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
 
 
-5758 -5757 -5760 -5758 
 40 % -0.014** -0.021*** -0.030*** -0.025** 21737 
 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] 
   -6205 -6206 -6212 -6211 
 Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). 
Additional control variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. 
Standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  
*** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics.  
 
 
TABLE 4 
Stamp duty and mobility – Differential effects by distance of move 
Type of move Distance of move < 10km Distance of move >10km 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 
20 % -0.054*** -0.036* 0.020 0.019 
 
[0.020] [0.020] [0.017] [0.018] 
 
-5915 -5929 -6651 -6649 
30 % -0.032*** -0.041*** 0.007 0.013 
 
[0.006] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010] 
 
-15995 -15995 -18127 -18126 
40 % -0.032*** -0.035*** 0.001 0.011 
 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] 
  -19118 -19117 -22472 -22474 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). 
Additional control variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. 
Standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  
*** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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TABLE 5 
Stamp duty and mobility – Differential effects by primary reason of move 
Type of move Housing and area Employment Life-events 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 
20 % -0.035** -0.022 0.008* 0.005 -0.007 -0.001 
 
[0.017] [0.018] [0.005] [0.005] [0.014] [0.014] 
 
-7696 -7707 -22839 -22845 -10917 -10921 
30 % -0.020*** -0.021*** 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.019*** 
 
[0.006] [0.008] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] 
 
-19965 -19963 -55811 -55812 -25432 -25436 
40 % -0.021*** -0.021*** 0.001 0.002 -0.009** -0.006 
 
[0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.006] 
  -23822 -23820 -68739 -68740 -29831 -29830 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control 
variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard errors clustered at household 
level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
 
TABLE 6 
Balance of covariates tests 
Panel A: 3rd order polynomial of house value  
Band around 
£250k cutoff Age 
Kids 
(0/1) 
Ln(hh 
income) 
GCE A-
levels 
or higher 
Bachelor 
degree 
or higher 
Un-
employed 
Commute 
in minutes 
30 % 0.618 0.021 0.040 0.021 0.031 -0.002 -0.753 
 
[0.638] [0.022] [0.034] [0.022] [0.020] [0.004] [1.476] 
40 % 1.988*** -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.001 -0.679 
  [0.571] [0.020] [0.030] [0.020] [0.018] [0.004] [1.317] 
Panel B: 4th order polynomial of house value  
Band around 
£250k cutoff Age 
Kids 
(0/1) 
Ln(hh 
income) 
GCE A-
levels 
or higher 
Bachelor 
degree 
or higher 
Un-
employed 
Commute 
in minutes 
30 % 0.125 0.052* 0.030 0.028 0.044 -0.004 1.922 
 
[0.887] [0.031] [0.048] [0.031] [0.028] [0.006] [1.773] 
40 % 0.079 0.040 0.031 0.017 0.031 -0.004 -0.826 
  [0.715] [0.025] [0.038] [0.025] [0.023] [0.005] [1.610] 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional 
control variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard errors 
clustered at household level in brackets*. p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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TABLE 7 
Stamp duty and mobility – Controls added  
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.015 -0.030 -0.047* -0.028 7222 
 
[0.018] [0.019] [0.027] [0.028] 
 
 
-1126 -1134 -1133 -1146 
 30 % -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.025*** -0.027** 16064 
 
[0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.014] 
 
 
-5509 -5508 -5508 -5508 
 40 % -0.015** -0.019** -0.028*** -0.026** 20769 
 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] 
   -6129 -6128 -6133 -6131 
 Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
year dummies, dummy for round house value, age, dummy for kids, 18 region dummies, dummy for GCE A-
levels, dummy for bachelor degree or higher and dummy for unemployed. Standard errors clustered at 
household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE A1 
Construction of type of move variables 
  Job-related moves 
Housing- and area- 
related moves 
Major life event- 
related moves 
Did you move for reasons that were wholly or partly to do with your own job, or employment 
opportunities? 
 
YES NO NO 
 
and/or and and 
What were your (other) main reasons for moving? 
 
Job reason, self Larger accommodation Move in with partner 
 
Job reason, other Smaller accommodation Split from partner 
 
 Own accommodation Move in with family 
 
(If other than job reasons given,  Buy accommodation Move from family 
 
not included in any category) No stairs Move in with friend 
  
Another type Closer to family or friends 
  
Disliked previous accommodation Move to college 
  
Better accommodation Left college 
  
Privacy Retirement 
  
Wants change Evicted, repossessed 
  
Disliked isolation Health reasons 
  
To rural environment 
 
  
From rural environment 
  
Traffic 
  
Area unsafe 
 
  
Noise 
 
  
Area unfriendly 
 
  
To specific place 
     Disliked area   
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TABLE A2 
Stamp duty and mobility – Observations close to £250k dropped 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Excluded house values £250k 
 
£245k-£255k £240k-£260k 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 
40 % -0.031** -0.027* -0.026** -0.021 -0.051*** -0.041* 
 
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.019] [0.021] 
  -5333 -5331 -5373 -5372 -5055 -5054 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control 
variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard errors clustered at household level in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics.  
 
 
TABLE A3  
Stamp duty and mobility – Sample includes  
only households saying they would like to move 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % 0.007 -0.014 -0.049 -0.006 1582 
 
[0.051] [0.056] [0.080] [0.085] 
 
 
1209 1210 1212 1206 
 30 % -0.069*** -0.077** -0.068* -0.040 3239 
 
[0.025] [0.034] [0.035] [0.048] 
 
 
1903 1905 1906 1907 
 40 % -0.030 -0.066** -0.096*** -0.050 4412 
 
[0.023] [0.029] [0.031] [0.039] 
   2777 2774 2769 2767 
 Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). 
Additional control variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard 
errors clustered at household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike 
Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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TABLE A4 
Stamp duty and mobility – Coefficients on nth order polynomials  
allowed to vary on different sides of cut-off 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value 
£250k cutoff 1st 2nd 3rd 
20 % -0.022 -0.017 -0.100 
 
[0.018] [0.033] [0.075] 
 
-1215 -1221 -1220 
30 % -0.034*** -0.014 -0.034 
 
[0.011] [0.017] [0.026] 
 
-5758 -5756 -5765 
40 % -0.018** -0.034** -0.016 
 
[0.009] [0.014] [0.023] 
  -6204 -6209 -6209 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). 
Additional control variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. 
Standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,  
*** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
 
TABLE A5 
Stamp duty and mobility – Standard errors clustered at household and  
£5k house value group level 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value (rounded up to closest £5k) 
£250k cutoff 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
30 % -0.027*** -0.032*** -0.025*** -0.031*** 
 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.010] [0.012] 
 
-5760 -5759 -5764 -5763 
40 % -0.016 -0.022** -0.030*** -0.027** 
 
[0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] 
  -6207 -6207 -6214 -6212 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control 
variables: dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard errors clustered at household 
level and £5k house value group level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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FIGURE A1 
Placebo tests with artificial cut-offs  
(Specification: 30% band and 3rd order polynomial, Outcome: all moves) 
 
 
 
FIGURE A2 
Placebo tests with artificial cut-offs  
(Specification: 40% band and 4
th
 order polynomial, Outcome: all moves) 
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